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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jake Allen Olivas filed, pro se, an "Illegal Sentence Motion," which the district 
court denied. On appeal, Mr. Olivas asserts that the district court erred when it denied 
his Illegal Sentence Motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Olivas pleaded guilty to burglary, felony, in 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-1401, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with two years fixed. (No. 32730 R., pp.66-67, 73-75.)1 The judgment 
specified that Mr. Olivas was to receive credit for any jail time served, to be applied at 
the end of the fixed sentence. (R., p.35.)2 Mr. Olivas then filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (No. 32730 
R., pp.76-77, 85-86.) Mr. Olivas filed an appeal, and the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an 
unpublished opinion, affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence and the order 
denying the Rule 35 motion. State v. Olivas, No. 32730, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 
646 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2006). 
Mr. Olivas subsequently filed, pro se, an "Illegal Sentence Motion." (R., pp.10-
23.) In the motion, Mr. Olivas asserted that he "has been fraudulently robbed of (202) 
days of parole time." (R., pp.11-12.) He asserted that I.C. §§ 18-309, 20-225 and 20-
228 were unconstitutional "by not accrediting [to a defendant] all of the time served 
while on probation, parole, jail, and prison time, since the time of arrest on the 
charge(s), [for which] he or she has been convicted." (R., pp.10-11.) "The parolee or 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of the record and transcript filed in 
Mr. Olivas' prior appeal, No. 32730. (Order Taking Judicial Notice, Mar. 6, 2014.) 
1 
probationer while under supervision is no less a prisoner than that of a prisoner 
physically confined." (R., p.11.) Mr. Olivas asserted that a judgment is a contract, and 
the statutes at issue violated Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 16 of the Idaho Constitution because they impaired the contractual 
obligations imposed by his judgment. (See R., pp.11-13.) "It is clearly established that 
time completed under supervision is without a doubt time served. To hinder, disqualify, 
or just take away said time constitutes 'incarceration without judicial process [which] is 
illegal."' (R., p.14.) Thus, Mr. Olivas requested that the district court "order every day 
served incarcerated either physically behind bars, on probation or parole time be 
credited 1.0.O.C. and any entity involved recognize fulfillment of Petitioner's 
sentence in accordance with all Constitutional Rights; State and Federal." (R., p.23.) 
The district court later issued an Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Correct Illegal Sentence. (R., pp.35-41.) The district court treated Mr. Olivas' motion 
as an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, because "Defendant 
requests that this Court review a sentence for illegality and that request falls under Rule 
35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules." (R., pp.36-37.) The district court then determined that 
it "does not need to decide whether the judgment was a contract because the cited 
Idaho statutes would not interfere with the contractual relationship if it existed." 
(R., p.38.) According to the district court, because I.C. §§ 18-309, 20-225 and 20-228 
were in effect as controlling law when Mr. Olivas was sentenced, they defined the terms 
of the judgment. (R., p.38.) The relevant portions of the statutes at issue either had not 
changed since Mr. Olivas' was sentenced, or the changes (to I.C. § 20-225) would not 
have impacted his sentence. (R., p.38.) 
2 All citations to "R." refer to the Limited Clerk's Record prepared for this appeal. 
2 
The district court also addressed "what appears to be the substance of 
Defendant's claim, i.e. the issue of whether the statutes are unconstitutional for not 
providing credit for all time under supervision." (R., p.38.) Following the reasoning of 
the United States District Court for the District of Idaho in Reinhart v. Johanson, No. CV-
05-362-E-BLW, 2007 WL 1959064 (D. Idaho July 3, 2007), the district court held "that 
Idaho Code §§ 18-309, 20-225, 20-228 violate neither the United States nor the Idaho 
Constitutions." (R., pp.38-39.) Thus, the district court denied Mr. Olivas' motion. 
(R., p.40.) 
Mr. Olivas then filed, pro se, a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Olivas' Illegal Sentence Motion? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Olivas' Illegal Sentence Motion 
Mr. Olivas asserts that the district court erred when it denied his Illegal Sentence 
Motion, because I.C. §§ 18-309, 20-225, and 20-228 are unconstitutional. 
As discussed above, the district court treated the Illegal Sentence Motion as an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence. (See R., pp.36-37.) 
However, the Illegal Sentence Motion, in substance, is better characterized as a request 
for credit for time served. In the motion, Mr. Olivas asserted that he "has been 
fraudulently robbed of (202) days of parole time" {R., pp.11-12), and requested "that this 
Court order every day served incarcerated either physically behind bars, on probation or 
parole time be credited by I.D.O.C." (R., p.23.) Thus, in substance Mr. Olivas 
requested that the district court correct the computation of credit for time served on 
parole. "Whether the district court properly applied the law governing credit for time 
served is a question of law over which we exercise free review." State v. Covert, 143 
Idaho 169, 170 (Ct. App. 2006). 
However, credit for time served on parole is not available as relief under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35, because Rule 35(c) only provides for motions "to correct a court's 
computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-309 
or 19-2603." See I.C.R. 35(c). Credit for time served on parole is not granted pursuant 
to those statutes, but may be granted pursuant to I.C. § 20-228. See Gibson v. Bennett, 
141 Idaho 270, 273-74 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When an inmate's parole is revoked, the time 
spent on parole does not count towards the completion of an inmate's sentence, unless 
the Commission for Pardons and Parole decides in its discretion that the time should be 
so counted."). 
5 
Further, "a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an appropriate mechanism for 
challenging an alleged impropriety or error in the [Idaho Department of Correction's] 
computation of a prisoner's sentence." Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 
352, 353, 355 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bates v. Murphy, 118 Idaho 239, 243 (1990); 
Calkins v. May, 97 Idaho 402 (1976); State v. Vega, 113 Idaho 756, 758 (Ct. App. 
1987)). A prisoner "may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to request that a court 
inquire into state or federal constitutional questions concerning ... [m]iscalculation of 
his sentence." I.C. § 19-4203(2)(c). Habeas corpus proceedings are separate from 
criminal proceedings and civil in nature. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 9 n.1 (1998). 
Mr. Olivas filed the Illegal Sentence Motion in his criminal case. (See R., p.10.) 
Mindful of the above authorities, Mr. Olivas asserts that the district court erred 
when it denied his Illegal Sentence Motion, because I.C. §§ 18-309, 20-225, and 20-228 
are unconstitutional. 3 Idaho's appellate courts have previously held that Section 18-309 
and Section 20-228 are constitutional. See State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763 (Ct. App. 
1989) (holding that the application of I.C. § 18-309 did not violate a defendant's equal 
protection or due process rights); Flores v. State, 109 Idaho 182 (Ct. App. 1985) 
3 Section 18-309 provides that, for time served on a sentence of incarceration after the 
entry of judgment, "[t]he remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal means is 
temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the 
term during which he was at large must not be computed as part of such term." 
I.C. § 18-309. 
Section 20-225 currently requires "[a]ny person under state probation or parole 
supervision ... to contribute not more than seventy-five dollars ($75.00) per month as 
determined by the board of correction" as payment for costs of supervision. I.C. § 20-
225. At time of Mr. Olivas' sentencing, the statute required payments of not more than 
fifty dollars ($50.00) per month. See 2005 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 68. 
Section 20-228 provides that, if a parolee is found to have violated the conditions of 
parole, the "person so recommitted must serve out the sentence, and the time during 
which such prisoner was out on parole shall not be deemed a part thereof; unless the 
commission, in its discretion, shall determine otherwise .... " I.C. § 20-228. 
6 
(holding that I.C. § 20-228 does not violate the separation of powers); see also Doan v. 
State, 132 Idaho 796 (1999) (holding that I.C. § 19-2513, by analogy to I.C. § 
does not implicate the separation of powers). 
However, whether the statutes at issue here are unconstitutional because they 
impair contractual obligations appears to be a matter of first impression. Both the 
United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution prohibit laws impairing the obligation 
of contracts. U.S. Const Art. I, § 1 O; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 16. By not crediting 
Mr. Olivas for the requested 202 days of parole time, the statutes at issue impair the 
contractual obligations imposed by his judgment. (See R., pp.11-13.) This is because 
time spent on parole is time served, and taking away credit for that time is illegal. (See 
R., pp.11-14.) Thus, I.C. §§ 18-309, 20-225, and 20-228 are unconstitutional. (See 
R., pp.11-13.) The district court erred when it denied Mr. Olivas' Illegal Sentence 
Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Olivas respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the district court's order denying his Illegal Sentence Motion, and remand his case for 
the entry of an order awarding him credit for 202 days served on parole. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 2014. 
~/? ~~·--~--
BEN P. MCGREEVY ~?-
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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